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Abstract
This paper presents a model of migration in which migration decisions are made with in-
complete information on the labor market conditions at destination. It provides an explanation
for how differences in the level of information about the destination can bring about differences
in economic outcomes related to migration, such as the migration propensity and the return to
migration. The implications of the model show the conditions under which information posi-
tively and negatively affects these outcomes. Thus, the model can be used to explain a wide set
of empirical ndings regarding the relationship between information and migration outcomes.
2005 CPS data are used to estimate the econometric model. The estimation results suggest that
increased access to information regarding destination labor markets increases one's likelihood
to migrate to another state. Furthermore, the ndings suggest that people who have more infor-
mation regarding the destination at the time of their migration decision on average experience
higher returns to migration.
1 Introduction
Since Sjaastad's inuential work, migration has been perceived as an investment in human capital
(1962). Economists who have studied the return to this investment have often looked at the wage
and earnings growth that are experienced by migrants as a result of their migration decisions. The
human capital theory of migration predicts that the present discounted value of lifetime earnings
at the destination exceeds the present discounted value of lifetime earnings at home; however,
it is silent on the direction of the more immediate wage or earnings growth due to migration.
Empirical literature has also failed to produce a consensus on the contemporaneous change in
wage and earnings of migrants that is brought about by migration. Findings of positive, negative
and insignicant returns to migration, calculated as contemporary wage and earnings growth, exist
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in the literature, begging for the question of why different migrants experience different returns to
their migration decisions1.
In this paper, I present a model of migration under incomplete information as an alternative
framework in which to study the consequences of migration. I start with the premise that infor-
mation about labor market conditions at the destination is an important determinant of migration.
Differences in the level of access to such information in the population can bring about differences
in economic outcomes related to migration, such as the migration propensity and the return to mi-
gration. For example, in an environment with incomplete information regarding post-migration
wages, negative wage growth can reect overestimation of migration wages among migrants. The
purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of incomplete information in migration decisions
and more specically the effect of increased information on migration outcomes. To that end, I
present a model of migration under incomplete information, discuss its theoretical implications and
provide an empirical analysis of how access to information about destination labor markets affects
the rate of state-to-state migration within the U.S. and the return to migration among migrants.
Economists acknowledge that information plays an important role in people's migration deci-
sions by directly affecting their expected benets from migration. Many studies have empirically
investigated the impact of incomplete information on migration behavior and have concluded that
information is a determinant of various migration-related outcomes, including migration propen-
sity (Greenwood, 1975; DaVanzo, 1976; Allen, 1979), return migration (DaVanzo and Morrison,
1981; Allen, 1979), post-move earnings growth (Kau and Sirmans, 1977), and job search duration
after the move (Gibbs, 1994). The theoretical foundation of most of this empirical work is rooted
in the job search model. In their paper, Herzog, Hoer and Schlottmann (1985) emphasize the
link between the job search model and migration under incomplete information and use the nd-
ings of the job search literature in developing their migration model with incomplete information.
Their model assumes that greater labor market information increases actual post-migration wages;
therefore, actual wages under incomplete information are less than the potential wages that people
would earn under perfect information. Berninghaus and Seifert-Vogt (1987) present a migration
model that is based on the sequential nature of the job search process. They assume that individ-
uals compare income draws at various destinations and choose a destination based on the results
of their comparison. After the move, they conduct a search to nd a job. A prediction of their
model is that greater uncertainty about the destination labor market increases one's probability of
migration.
1Ham et al. provide an excellent review of the empirical literature on the contemporary wage and earnings change
due to migration (2006). As summarized in their paper, Polachek and Horvath (1977), Borjas, Bronars and Trejo
(1992), Tunali (2000) and Ham, Li and Reagan (2006) have found negative returns to migration while insignicant
returns have been found by Bartel (1979), Hunt and Kau (1985), and Yankow (2003) for different migrant groups.
Bartel (1979), Hunt and Kau (1985) and Yankow (2003) also report positive returns for other migrant subsamples.
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In this paper, I present an alternative model of migration under incomplete information. The
model is based on the assumption that there is a random component to destination wages that
are not perfectly observable by the individual. The individual does not know the population
distribution of this random component, so she cannot use its population mean in calculating her
prediction of her post-migration wages. The model is based on an information acquisition process
initially proposed by Allen and Eaton (2005). According to this process, the individual receives
a sample of n draws from the population distribution of the random variable, so in effect, she
draws a sample mean. She uses the sample mean of the n observations to calculate the expected
value of her post-migration wages. The number of observations that she receives, n, increases
with the level of her information about the destination. Since the variance of the distribution of
sample mean decreases with n; in this model, information affects the worker's migration decision
by changing the spread of the distribution from which she draws the sample mean. The model
allows for both underprediction and overprediction of destination wages in the population. Allen
and Eaton have used this information acquisition process to explain the effect of information about
a destination to the rate of migration to that destination. In this paper, I focus on the role of
incomplete information in bringing about the variation in the return to migration observed in the
data.
The model presented in this paper predicts that migrants on average overestimate their post-
migration wages. This result provides an explanation for the observation made in earlier research
that "migration should select against those who underestimate the net returns to migration and
attract those who overestimate them" (DaVanzo, 1983). The prevalence of overprediction of post-
migration wages among migrants can explain the negative return to migration found in previous
empirical research. In a setting of incomplete information, individuals who overestimate their
post-migration wages are more likely to experience negative returns to migration. The model also
predicts that the expected value of the prediction error, the difference between the predicted and
actual post-migration wages, in the entire population is zero. Therefore, the implication that mi-
grants on average experience positive prediction error does not depend on a restrictive assumption
such as a positive support for the prediction error in the population.
Furthermore, the implications of the model reveal that increased information about destination
labor markets can have both positive and negative effects on the probability of migration and the
return to migration. Thus, the model can be used to explain a wide set of empirical ndings
regarding the relationship between information and migration outcomes. The effect of information
on the probability of migration hinges on the difference between the expected value of home wages
and the expected value of destination wages in the population. If the population mean of wages at
origin exceeds that of the wages at destination, increased information regarding destination labor
market conditions is likely to change the migration decision of those who used to overestimate
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their post-migration wages. The withdrawal of these individuals from the migrant pool leads
to a decrease in the migration rate. If the population mean of wages at origin is lower than
the population mean of wages at destination, access to more information is likely to change the
migration decisions of those who used to underestimate their post-migration wages. As these
individuals decide to migrate under increased information, the migration rate increases.
Increased information regarding destination labor market conditions affects the return to migra-
tion through two channels, which I name as composition and scale effects due to their resemblance
of the composition and scale effects of Borjas' model (1987). The composition effect reects
the impact of information on the return to migration through its effect on the composition of the
migrant sample, conditional on the rate of migration. As a result of more information, the migrant
sample consists of a greater proportion of people with high destination wages, and this change in
the composition of migrants has a positive effect on the return to migration, conditional on the
size of the migrant sample. The scale effect describes the effect of information on the return to
migration through its impact on the size of the migrant sample. A positive scale effect exists when
increased information leads to a withdrawal of overestimators from the migrant pool. As the mi-
grant pool is made up of a smaller proportion of people who used to overestimate their destination
wages, the average return to migration among migrants increases. A negative scale effect, on the
other hand, is brought about when information brings about a surge in migrants who used to un-
derestimate their post-migration wages. As the migrant pool comprises of a greater proportion of
people who used to underestimate their destination wages, the average return to migration among
migrants decreases.
The theoretical model forms the basis for the empirical work which investigates how informa-
tion about the destination labor market affects the rate of state-to-state migration within the U.S.
and the wage gain associated with such moves. I use data from the March supplement to the 2005
Current Population Survey in the analysis. I draw on the results of previous research regarding the
role of network externalities in migration. These results indicate that one of the channels through
which people obtain information about other regional labor markets is their interaction with their
friends and neighbors. One can learn about the job prospects in another state by talking to her
friends and neighbors who have already migrated to or migrated from that state. Based on this
statement, I assume that people who live in states with high gross migration rates have greater
access to information about labor market conditions in other states since residents of such states
are more likely to come into contact with people who have moved to or from other states.
In the estimation of the migration probability, the use of the state gross migration rate as a
proxy for the residents' level of information about destination labor markets presents a potential
problem of endogeneity because the gross migration rate can be correlated with unobservables
such as local economic conditions which are also likely to affect a resident's migration decision.
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Therefore, I use the median age in the state of origin as an instrumental variable for the state's gross
migration rate in estimating the migration probit regression. The median age in the state is likely
to affect the migration rate in that state since age is a determinant of migration; however, it should
have no effect on an individual resident's migration decision when the decision is conditional on
the resident's own age. The instrumental variable probit regression results indicate that increased
access to information regarding destination labor markets increases one's likelihood to migrate to
another state.
In order to address the potential endogeneity of the gross migration rate in the wage equation,
I use a modied version of the Heckman's two-step estimator in estimating the wage equation for
migrants and stayers. The estimation results indicate that increased access to information about
destination labor markets has no signicant effect on the wages of migrants and a signicantly
negative effect on the wages of stayers. In addition, I use the parameter estimates of the wage
equation to calculate the return to migration among migrants, which is the difference between their
reported post-migration wages and the estimated wage they would have earned had they decided
to stay. The average return to migration is greater for individuals who have migrated from states
with high gross migration rates. Furthermore, comparative static exercises show that increasing
the gross migration rate leads to an increase in the return to migration, conditional on the original
subsample of migrants. I also nd that the return to migration is highest among high school
dropouts and lowest among individuals with some college.
The paper is divided into several sections. Section II presents the theoretical model and dis-
cusses its implications with respect to the probability of migration and the return to migration.
Section III presents the econometric model and explains the empirical strategy employed in this
study. Section IV discusses the dataset, and Section V contains the results of the empirical analy-
sis. Concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 The Framework
Individuals make a decision between moving (M = 1) and staying (M = 0) based on their current
wages, their expected wages at the destination and their moving costs. They decide to move if
they anticipate their wages at destination to be higher than the sum of their current wages and the
moving costs. Consider individual i who has two wage alternatives: y1i if she migrates and y0i if
she does not migrate. These alternatives are given by
y0i = 0 + 0i (1)
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y1i = 1 + 1i + "i (2)
where 0 and 1 represent the population mean of wages at the origin and the population mean of
the wages at the destination, respectively, and 0i and 1i represent the deviations from the mean
that are observed by the individual. While the individual perfectly observes 0; 1; 0i and 1i, she
does not observe "i prior to migration, and as such "i can be interpreted as the random component
of one's post-migration wages from the perspective of the individual at the time of the migration
decision.
The information acquisition process presented in this model was originally proposed by Allen
and Eaten in their migration model (2005)2. I assume that the individual does not have complete
information in the sense that she does not know the distribution of " in the population. Instead,
she observes n number of random and independent draws from the population distribution " and
uses the average of the n draws as a predictor of "i. Let "i be the average of the n random draws
observed by individual i: Then, the individual anticipates her wages at the destination to be ye1i
where
ye1i = 1 + 1i + "i (3)
The information acquisition process in this model is based on the assumption that information
about the population mean of the random term, "; is costly. n, the size of the sample drawn
from the population distribution of "; is a decreasing function of the cost of acquiring information.
Individuals who face high costs of acquiring information about the labor market conditions at the
destination have low values of n; and those, who face low costs of acquiring information and thus
can obtain more about the destination labor market, have high values of n:
The one-time moving cost faced by individual i is given by
ci = c + ci (4)
where both c and ci are known by the individual at the time of her migration decision. Then,
individual i's migration decision can be characterized as
M = 1 if ye1i   y0i   ci > 0
M = 0 otherwise (5)
2Allen and Eaton's model focuses on explaining how the migration propensity changes with information about the
destination. The purpose of this paper includes studying the effect of information on the return to migration. This
difference in focus brings about differences in the set-up of the two models. For example, in Allen and Eaton's model,
all individuals in a given origin have identical expectations of their future earnings at origin. In the model presented
here, individuals' expectation of their future home earnings is a random variable that follows a continuous probability
distribution.
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Note that y1i represents the actual post-migration wages while ye1i represents individual i's
anticipation of her post-migration wages at the time of the migration decision. Furthermore,
the random components, 0; 1, and c; are observed by the individual but are unknown to the
researcher while " is unknown to both the individual and the researcher. In order to be able to
further pursue the implications of the model, I assume that 0; 1, c; and " are jointly normal with
zero means and the covariance matrix
 =
266664
20 01 0c 0"
01 
2
1 1c 1"
0c 1c 
2
c c"
0" 1" c" 
2
"
377775
Since " is distributed normally in the population, the sample mean, "; also follows a normal
distribution where "  N(0; 2"
n
): In addition, since n is inversely related to the variance of ";
access to more information about the destination labor market, represented by an increase in n in
this model, decreases the variance of " that individuals use in calculating their anticipated post-
migration wages. As n increases, individuals' " draws become more concentrated around the
actual population mean of "; which is assumed to be zero. Thus, individuals move from a situation
of incomplete information towards one of complete information, in which they know the expected
value of " in the population and can use it in predicting their post-migration wages.
2.2 The Probability of Migration
From the perspective of the researcher, the probability that a randomly chosen individual chooses
to migrate is given by
P = Pr( > 0 + c   1) = 1  (z) (6)
where  = 1 + "  0   c, z = 0+c 1 ; and  is the cdf of a standard normal distribution:
Since n captures the individual's level of information regarding the destination labor market
conditions, the effect of information on migration-related outcomes, such as the migration propen-
sity and the return to migration, can be studied by analyzing the effect of n on these outcomes.
Based on Equation 6, the effect of n on the probability of migration is given by
@P
@n
=  (z)  @z
@
 @
@n
(7)
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As shown in the Appendix, the sign of @P
@n
depends on the sign of 0 + c   1: In particular,
@P
@n
> 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0
@P
@n
< 0 if 0 + c   1 > 0 (8)
According to this result, as people have more information about the destination labor market
conditions, the probability of migration moves in the direction of higher expected wages in pop-
ulation. If the population mean of home wages is higher than the population mean of wages at
destination minus the moving cost, then the probability of migration decreases as people become
more informed. If the population mean of wages at home is lower than the population mean of
destination wages minus the moving cost, then access to more information has a positive effect on
the probability of migration.
Before explaining the intuition behind this result, one should note that this model allows for
both underprediction and overprediction of post-migration wages by individuals depending on their
"i and "i draws. In particular, an individual overpredicts her post-migration wages if "i > "i: In
that case the individual makes a positive prediction error since "i "i > 0: Similarly, the individual
underpredicts her post-migration wages if "i < "i: In that case the "i "i < 0; and the individual's
prediction error is negative.
The mathematical intuition behind Equation 8 can be explained as follows: Suppose that the
population mean of wages at origin is smaller than the population mean of wages at the destination
minus the moving cost. Then as n increases and individuals' " draws move closer to zero, people
who are likely to change their migration decisions are those who initially had low " values. As
their " draws become closer to zero after the increase in n, they become more likely to choose
migration, thus leading to an increase in the migration rate. The opposite result holds when the
population mean of wages at origin is greater than the population mean of wages at the destination
minus the moving cost. In that case, those who are likely to change their migration decisions are
those who initially had high " values and decided to migrate. After n increases and their " draws
approach zero, these individuals become less likely to choose migration, leading to a decrease in
the probability of migration in the population.
The incomplete information in this model, characterized as the individuals' lack of information
regarding the population distribution of ", has unique implications on the migration rate that cannot
be captured by a standard model in which the individuals know the population distribution of ".
If the individuals know the expected value of " in the population, then ye1i = 1 + 1i + E(") =
1 + 1i under the current assumption that E(") is zero. Consequently, the individual chooses to
migrate as long as 1 + 1i > 0 + c + 0i + ci, and the probability of migration is given by
P = Pr(1   0   c > 0 + c   1): In such a model, the variance of "; which reects the
8
level of uncertainty surrounding post-migration wages, has no effect on the individual's migration
propensity.
Hypothesis 1 The individual's level of information regarding the destination labor market posi-
tively affects the probability of migration if 0 + c   1 < 0: Otherwise, its effect on the
probability of migration is negative.
2.3 The Return to Migration
The return to migration, R; can be dened as the difference between what migrants earn at the
destination and what they would have earned at home had they stayed. Mathematically,
R = E(y1jM = 1)  E(y0jM = 1) (9)
where E(y1jM = 1) gives the expected value of wages of migrants at the "new" location, and
E(y0jM = 1) gives the expected value of wages of migrants at "home." If we let ! = 1 + ";
! = Corr(!; ) and 1 =
(z)
1 (z) ; then the expected value of post-migration wages of migrants
can be stated as
E(y1jM = 1) = 1 + E(!j > 0 + c   1) = 1 + !!1 (10)
Similarly, the expected value of pre-migration wages of migrants can be expressed as
E(y0jM = 1) = E(0 + 0j > 0 + c   1) = 0 + 001 (11)
where 0 = Corr(0; ): Then R can be stated as
R = 1   0 +
 
!!   00

1 = 1   0 + A
1

(12)
where A = 21   210 + 20   1c + 0c + 1"   0"   c".
Before investigating effect of information on the return to migration, I would like to discuss
the implications of the model on the average prediction error among migrants. As shown in the
Appendix, the expected value of the prediction error among migrants is positive.
E(ye1jM = 1)  E(y1jM = 1) =
1


2"
n

> 0 (13)
Therefore, the average migrant overestimates her destination wages. Based on this implication,
this model provides an explanation for the observation made in earlier research that "migration
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should select against those who underestimate the net returns to migration and attract those who
overestimate them" (DaVanzo, 1983). It is important to note that this theoretical result is not con-
tingent on restrictive assumptions about the distribution of the prediction error in the population.
In fact, the model allows for both over- and underestimation of destination wages, and it generates
a positive prediction error among migrants even as the expected value of the prediction error in
the population is zero (E( "i   "i) = 0). This implication distinguishes the model presented here
from earlier models by Herzog et al. (1985) and Daneshvary et al. (1992) which also conclude
that migrants on average overestimate their destination wages. In these earlier models, the posi-
tive prediction error among migrants is contingent on the assumption that the prediction error has
a positive support over the entire population. These models assume that reservation wages are
monotonically increasing over the level of information; thus everyone in the population underes-
timates their actual post-migration wages, leading to a positive expected value of the prediction
error in the population.
Furthermore, the model presented here implies that as n goes to innity, 1 and  approach
constant values, 
2
"
n
approaches zero, and hence the expected value of the prediction error among
migrants (E(ye1jM = 1)   E(y1jM = 1)) approaches zero. Intuitively, as individuals approach
having complete information, the average prediction error among migrants goes to zero.
The implication that the average prediction error among migrants is positive provides an ex-
planation for the negative return to migration found in previous empirical research. As stated in
the Introduction, several studies have found negative return to migration among migrants. For
example, Tunali nds that about 75 percent of migrants in his sample realize negative returns to
migration (2000). One of the explanations for the negative return to migration is that migrants
overestimate their post-migration wages, only to realize after the migration that their actual post-
migration wages are less than their wages at the origin. By showing that the overestimation of
post-migration wages is prevalent among migrants, the model presented here provides an explana-
tion for the negative return to migration within a human capital investment approach to migration
when individuals have incomplete information regarding destination labor market conditions.
Next I turn to the question of how the level of information about the destination labor market
affects the return to migration. Do migrants who have a better knowledge of the labor market
conditions at the destination experience a higher return to their migration decisions? The impact
of information on the return to migration is summarized by the effect of n on R: If 0c = 1c =
0" = 1" and c" = 0; then this derivative can be expressed as
@R
@n
=

1

 @1
@n
  1
2
 @
@n

V ar(1   0) (14)
As shown in the Appendix, the sign of this derivative is determined by the sign of
h
1

 @1
@n
  1
2
 @
@n
i
:
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The rst term in the brackets described the effect of n on R through its impact on the selection
and the size of the migrant sample. I will call this effect the "scale effect" since in a mathematical
sense, it is similar to the "scale effect" described in Borjas' migration model (1987). The direction
of the scale effect is inherently tied to the direction of the migration rate and the conditions that
determine it. The scale effect is positive under the same conditions when @P
@n
< 0 , and it is
negative under the same conditions when @P
@n
> 0 (i.e. @1
@n
> 0 when 0 + c   1 > 0; and
@1
@n
< 0 when 0 + c   1 < 0). As mentioned above, when 0 + c   1 > 0; the marginal
individual who changes her migration decision as a result of more information is one who had
previously overestimated her destination wages. As overestimators update their predictions of
their post-migration wages, a portion of them are likely to change their migration decision from
migration to staying, leading to a withdrawal of overestimators from the pool of migrants. As the
migrant pool comprises of a smaller proportion of people who make a negative prediction error,
the average post-migration wages in the migrant subsample increases, and the average return to
migration rises. Therefore, a positive scale effect reects the fact that as a smaller portion of
migrants overpredict their destination wages, the return to migration is positively affected by an
increase in n:
On the other hand, the scale effect is negative when the population mean of home wages plus
the moving costs is less than the population mean of destination wages (0+ c  1 < 0): In that
case, the marginal individual who changes her migration decision is one who had underestimated
her post-migration wages. When more information is available, underestimators of future wages
are likely to choose to migrate, bringing about an injection of new migrants into the migrant pool
and a higher migration rate. These new migrants are likely to come from the lower tail of the
destination wage distribution because people from the higher tail would most likely have chosen
migration initially even if they had underestimated their future wages. The injection of new
migrants into the migrant pool from the lower tail of the destination wage distribution brings about
a negative scale effect.
The second term in the brackets can be perceived as the effect of n on R through its impact on
the composition of migrants, holding the migration rate constant. When n increases, the variances
of " and ye1 become smaller while the variance of y1 remains constant. Then, if 0 + c   1 > 0;
the migrant sample consists of a greater proportion of people who have higher destination wages
than anticipated. This change in the composition of migrants puts an upward pressure on R:
If 0 + c   1 < 0; the migrant sample consists of a smaller proportion of people who have
lower destination wages than anticipated. Such a change in the composition of the migrant sample
also has a positive effect on R. Therefore, the composition effect is unambiguously positive.
Intuitively, as people have more information about the destination labor market, the migrant sample
consists of a greater percentage of people from the upper tail of the y1 distribution, bringing about
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an increase in the return to migration.
The net effect of n on R then depends on the sum of the scale and composition effects. When
0 + c   1 > 0; both effects are positive, generating a positive effect of information on the
return to migration. When 0 + c   1 < 0; the composition effect is positive, and the scale
effect is negative; thus the sign of @R
@n
depends on which effect dominates. In that case, information
increases the return to migration if 1

 @1
@n
< 1
2
 @
@n
: In sum,
@R
@n
< 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 and
 1  @1@n
 > 12  @@n
@R
@n
> 0 otherwise (15)
Hypothesis 2 Information positively affects the return to migration if 0 + c   1 > 0:
Hypothesis 3 If information negatively affects the return to migration, then it positively affects
the migration rate since both conditions hold under 0 + c   1 < 0.
Next, I consider how an increase in the variance of " affects the return to migration. Within
the framework of this model, " captures the uncertainty faced by an individual regarding her des-
tination wages. Based on Equation 2, " directly affects the variance of wages at the destination.
Therefore, the effect of " on the return to migration provides insight on how the variance of wages
at destination impacts the average return to migration. It provides an explanation for what hap-
pens to the average return to migration when the wage distribution at the destination becomes more
unequal.
Mathematically, the effect of " on the return to migration is given by3
@R
@"
=

1

 @1
@"
  1
2
 @
@"

V ar(1   0) (16)
This net effect can also be decomposed into a composition and scale effect. It can be shown
that the composition effect, given by the second term in the bracket, is negative. As " goes up and
the uncertainty that one faces in her destination earning increases, conditional on n; the individual's
prediction of her post-migration wages becomes less precise, thus negatively affecting her return to
migration. An increase in " also impacts the selection of migrant and the migration rate revealed
by the scale effect (the rst term in the brackets). The scale effect can be positive or negative
depending on the relative values of 0; c; and 1: If 0+c 1 < 0; an increase in the variance
of post-migration wages causes the sample of migrants to consist of a smaller proportion of people
who overpredict their actual post-migration wages. In this case, the scale effect is positive. On
3See the Appendix for the derivation of @R@" :
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the other hand, if 0 + c   1 > 0; an increase in the variance of post-migration wages brings
about a change in the sample of migrants so that a greater proportion of migrants overpredict their
post-migration wages. As a result, the scale effect associated with an increase in " is negative.
The net effect of a change in " on R depends on the sum of the composition and scale effects. In
particular,
@R
@"
> 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 and
1

 @1
@"
>
12  @@"

@R
@"
< 0 otherwise (17)
The discussion above can also be used to generate the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4 If 0 + c   1 > 0; a higher variance of wages at the destination brings about a
lower return to migration.
Hypothesis 5 If the variance of wages at the destination positively affects the return to migration,
then 0 + c   1 < 0:
Hypothesis 4 can be combined with the earlier hypotheses to lead to the following result: If
the expected value of home wages in the population exceeds the expected value of destination
wages minus the moving costs in the population (0 + c   1 > 0), then an increased access to
information about the destination leads to a decreased migration rate and an increased return to
migration among migrants. The model also implies that if the wage inequality at the destination
increases under this assumption, the return to migration decreases as a result.
3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy employed in this paper involves investigating the effect that greater access
to information has on migration outcomes by estimating the reduced form of the behavioral model
discussed above. A critical part of this strategy is to distinguish between individuals facing dif-
ferent costs of information and thus different levels of access to information regarding destination
labor markets. One of the channels through which people obtain information about other regional
labor markets is their interaction with their friends and neighbors. For instance, one can learn about
job prospects in another state by talking to her friends and neighbors who have already migrated
to that state or migrated from that state.
Social interaction as an information-enhancing factor in the migration decision is implicit in
several other studies. For instance, Carrington et al. present a model in which moving costs are
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inversely related to the number of immigrants in the destination (1996). They use the results of
their theoretical model to explain why the Great Black Migration from the South to the North took
place during a time when the income gap between the two regions was narrowing. Spilimbergo
and Ubeda develop a model which species the role of social interaction in the migration decision
(2004). Their work is based on the assumption that one's family and friend network at home
might discourage her from migrating. They nd multiple equilibria and use the existence of
multiple equilibria to explain why different groups have persistently exhibited different migration
rates (eg. White vs. African-American, U.S. vs. Europe). In addition, previous literature on
migration has pointed to the role of network externalities in migration, referring to the fact that
each migrant lowers the cost of migration for family and friends at home (Massey et al., 1993).
Social interaction is implicit in these studies because one of the causes of network externalities
in this setting is the informal information channels that carry information from people who have
already migrated to those who are at the origin. Network externalities have been used as a reason
behind ethnic clustering of immigrants in host countries across Europe and in the U.S.
If interaction with friends, family and neighbors who have migrated to or from one's home state
is an informal medium for information about other labor markets outside her state, then residents
of states that experience a high level of outmigration or inmigration are more likely to learn about
other labor markets. Information gathering through social interaction implies that people who live
in states with high migration rates are on average better informed about destination labor markets
since they have a higher likelihood of interacting with people who have moved to or from a different
state. Based on this reasoning, I use the gross migration rate in one's home state, which is based
on the sum of inmigration and outmigration in the state, as a proxy for her level of information
about destination labor markets. I assume that people who live in states with high gross migration
rates have easier access to information about different labor markets outside their states and thus
are able to collect information at a lower cost.
A potential problem with this strategy is that the gross migration rate is likely to be endogenous
to the residents' migration decisions. A state's gross migration rate is partially determined by the
state's economic conditions, which can also affect the residents' migration decisions. To address
this potential endogeneity problem, I use the median age in the state as an instrument for the
state's gross migration rate in the estimation. I believe that the median age in the state is a suitable
instrument as it is likely to be related to the endogenous variable, the state's gross migration rate,
and unrelated to an individual's migration decision. The median age in the state is likely to
be a factor in the state's gross migration rate because previous studies have documented age to
be a signicant determinant of migration and one that is negatively related to the probability of
migration (Greenwood, 1985). Therefore, one can expect states with a younger population to have
more outmigration, which directly impacts the gross migration rate in the state. Furthermore, the
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median age in the state is not likely to affect a resident's decision to migrate, conditional on the age
of the resident. Although the individual's own age is a factor that affects her migration propensity,
the median age in her state of origin should have no inuence on her migration decision when
conditional on her own age.
Based on the theoretical framework, the econometric model can be expressed as a switching
regression model with the following specication:
y0 = 0X + 0g + 0 (18)
y1 = 1X + 1g + ! (19)
y = Z +  (20)
M(Z) = 1[y  0] (21)
y =My1 + (1 M)y0 (22)
The error terms, 0; !; and  are assumed to be independent of X and Z; and they are assumed to
follow a trivariate normal distribution with zero expectations and the positive denite covariance
matrix given below: 264 
2
0 0! 0
0! 
2
! !
0 ! 
2

375 (23)
y is the observed wages in the sample, with y1 denoting the wages of migrants and y0 denoting the
wages of stayers. The latent variable, y; determines the regime, i.e. the individual's migration sta-
tus (M): This specication assumes that the population means of earnings and costs (0; 1; c);
which capture the deterministic components of earnings and cost in the theoretical model, are lin-
ear functions of observable characterictics. The vector of observables, X; includes variables that
affect one's earnings, and the vector Z includes explanatory variables that affect earnings as well
as those that determine moving costs. Both X and Z contain exogenous explanatory variables. g
is an endogenous variable, which is correlated with the error terms in the earnings equations, 0
and !.
The given specication describes a switching regression model where one of the regressors in
the outcome equation (earnings equation) is endogenous. The estimation technique should take
into account two issues: 1) the self-selection of migrants, which may result in migrants being
systematically different than non-migrants in terms of unobservable characteristics (i.e. the esti-
mation method should allow for the condition that Cov(0; ) 6= 0 and/or Cov(!; ) 6= 0); 2) the
endogeneity of g in the earnings equation (i.e. Cov(g; 0) 6= 0 and/or Cov(g; !) 6= 0). I estimate
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the model using a modied version of the two-step method developed by Heckman (1974, 1976,
1978) and Lee (1978, 1979). In the rst stage, the migration equation (Equation 21) is estimated
using a probit regression, and the estimated parameters are used to generate the Inverse Mill's
Ratio for every observation. In the second stage, the calculated inverse mill's ratio is added to
the earnings equation (Equation 22) as a regressor, and the earning equation is estimated by two
stage least squares using instrumental variables for g. Identication requires that the instruments
include at least one exogenous variable that is not included in X (Wooldrigde, 2002).
4 Data
The individual-level data including demographic, labor market and migration variables come from
the March supplement to the 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS). The extraction of the data
was performed using the IPUMS-CPS, which is an integrated set of the March CPS from 1962-
2006 (King et al., 2004). One of the advantages of using the 2005 CPS is that it allows for the
creation of two different migration variables. The rst variable, mig1, indicates whether the indi-
vidual migrated to a different state within the past year, and the second variable, mig5, indicates
whether the individual migrated to a different state within the past ve years. Although the re-
spondent's migration activity within the past year is asked in every year of the CPS with a few
exceptions, her migration activity over the past ve years is not available in every year. Currently,
the ve-year migration indicator is available for 1980, 1985, 1995 and 2005.
Individuals who moved to another state and returned to their home state within the past year
are considered non-migrants according to the mig1 indicator. Similarly, individuals who have
migrated and returned to their home states within the last ve years are considered as non-migrants
according to the mig5 denition. It is plausible to think that more return migration would occur
within a ve-year span compared to a one-year span. Therefore, I assume that the sample of
migrants dened by mig1 consists of a greater proportion of individuals who will eventually return
to their home states. In the empirical analysis, I use both state-to-state migration indicators. Since
mig1 and mig5 generate samples of migrants that differ with respect to the proportion who may
return to home state in the future, a comparison of results based on mig1 and mig5 can enable the
researcher to make inferences on the possible effects of "return migration" on several migration
outcomes.
Log wages are used as the dependent variable in the earnings equation. As a result, the return
to migration can be interpreted as the wage growth due to migration. Both household earnings
and wages have been used by previous studies investigating the return to migration. For instance,
while Ham et al. focus on wage growth due to migration, Tunali (2000) studies the change in
household earnings resulting from migration. The hourly wages are calculated by dividing the
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respondents' earnings by the number of hours worked, and the hourly wage variable included in
the CPS is used whenever it is reported by the respondent.
State migration rates used in the analysis are obtained from the calculations performed by the
U.S. Census Bureau using the U.S. Census 2000 (Franklin, 2003). These calculations are based
on the number of people who reported having moved across states between 1995 and 2000. The
median age in each state also comes from the U.S. Census Bureau's tabulations on the U.S. Census
2000 (Meyer, 2001). The state-level data on migration rates and median age are linked to the
individual-level data by the non-migrant's state of residence and the migrant's state of origin.
The explanatory variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 1. The number of children in
the household and whether the individual owns her dwelling are used as factors affecting migration
cost and thus are excluded from the wage equation. The sample is limited to civilians aged 15 or
older who are in the labor force. It contains 97,864 observations.
According to the statistics reported in Table 1, 2.6 percent of the sample reported living in a
different state than they did a year ago, and 8.1 percent reported living in a different state than they
did ve years ago. Table 1 also lists the average characteristics of movers and stayers where migra-
tion is dened by the individuals movement across states within the past year. These descriptive
statistics reveal that movers on average are younger, less experienced and more educated than stay-
ers. In addition, a smaller proportion of movers are married and own their homes compared to
stayers, and people who migrate have on average fewer number of children in the household. Both
of these ndings suggest that stayers tend to have higher moving costs generated by selling home,
changing children's schools and nding work for the spouse at the destination. Movers and stayers
are also quite different with respect to their employment status. Movers are more than twice as
likely to be unemployed during the week of the interview than stayers, and they are less likely to
be self-employed after the move compared to stayers.
5 Results
5.1 The Probability of Migration
Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results of the migration equation. Speci-
cations (I) and (II) estimates come from the estimation of an ordinary probit regression with and
without the gross migration rate in the state of origin as an explanatory variable. In specication
(III), the gross migration rate is instrumented using the median age in the state of origin. All
specications are estimated for two dependent variables: mig1 (indicator for the state-to-state mi-
gration within the past year) and mig5 (indicator for the state-to-state migration within the past ve
years).
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The marginal effects reported in column 1 indicate that the probability of migration across
states is positively affected by age and negatively affected by the number of years in the labor
market. Men are 0.26 percent more likely to move than women while race and marital status do
not signicantly affect the decision to migrate. Number of children and owning a house have a
negative effect on one's likelihood to migrate. This result is consistent with the notion that the
number of children and owning a house lead to higher moving costs and thus hinder migration.
People who report being unemployed are 1.6 percent more likely to have migrated from another
state within the past year, suggesting that unemployment can be more prevalent among recent
migrants than non-migrants. These results also indicate that the propensity to migrate does not
differ signicantly between educational groups or across occupational categories.
The marginal effects reported in column 2 refer to the estimation of specication (I) probit
using mig5 as the dependent variable. As stated above, one of the key differences between mig1
and mig5 is that due to its wider span, mig5 indicator points to migrant sample which consists of a
smaller proportion of individuals who would return to their home state after the migration. Mig1,
on the other hand, yields a migrant sample consisting of a greater proportion of people who may
become return migrants in the future. The marginal effects, found using mig1 as the dependent
variable, retain their signs when mig5 is used as a dependent variable. However, the magnitudes
of the marginal effects become greater for most variables when migration status is determined by
migration activity over the past ve years. Thus, the factors determining migration seem to have
an even stronger effect on the migration decision when migration is dened by movement across
states within the past ve years, and these effects seem to be diluted when the return migrants make
up a greater portion of the migrant sample. Although the line of inquiry regarding return migration
is not pursued in this paper, these results provide indirect support for other research showing that
return migrants are systematically different from permanent migrants.
Specication (II) probit results reveal that gross migration rates in the state of origin are pos-
itively related to the probability of migration. However, a positive relationship between a state's
gross migration rate and an individual's decision to migrate may be spurious in nature if the state
migration rate is affected by local economic conditions, which are also likely to inuence the res-
ident's migration decision. In order to address the potential endogeneity of the gross migration
rate, I use median age in the state as an instrument for the state's gross migration rate (Specication
(III)). The results of the IV probit regression presented in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 show
that the gross migration rate in the home state has a positive impact on an individual's likelihood
to migrate to another state. According to these estimates, increasing the gross migration rate in
the home state by 10 percent increases a resident's probability of migrating out of the state by 2.7
percent. The magnitude of this effect is higher when mig5 is used as the migration indicator. In
that case, increasing the gross migration rate in the home state by 10 percent leads to a 5.8 percent
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increase in the a resident's propensity to move out of the state. These results suggest that greater
access to information about the destination labor market positively affects one's probability of mi-
grating to another state. The effect is stronger in magnitude when the migrant sample includes a
smaller share of return migrants.
5.2 The Return to Migration
The calculation of the return to migration requires the estimation of the wage equation for movers
and stayers. The wage equation is estimated as the second step in a two-step procedure, which is
designed to take into account the self-selection of movers. The parameter estimates of specication
(I) in Table 2 are used in calculating the inverse mill's ratio for each individual in the sample, and
then the estimated inverse mill's ratio is added to the wage equation as an exogenous regressor.
In Table 3, I present the parameter estimates of the wage equation using OLS and 2SLS. In the
2SLS estimation, the median age in state is used as an instrument for the gross migration rate. The
econometric model is estimated using two separate indicators for state-to-state migration: mig1
and mig5.
The OLS results with mig1 as the migration indicator reveal that age, college education, being
male, white and married positively affect wages of both movers and stayers. Managers have higher
wages among migrants, and service and production workers have lower wages among stayers. The
convexity of the age wage prole is more prominent within the stayer subsample as the coefcient
on age squared is signicantly negative. Experience has a negative effect on the wages of stayers
while its effect is insignicant on the wages of migrants. The OLS estimates also show that the
gross migration rate in the state of origin does not have a statistically signicant effect on the wages
of migrants while it has a signicantly negative effect on the wages of stayers.
When the gross migration rate is instrumented using median age in the state, the coefcient of
the gross migration rate changes in magnitude for both migrants and non-migrants. In particular,
the coefcient becomes remains statistically insignicant for the mover subsample. However, it
becomes more negative for the stayer subsample. According to the 2SLS estimates, non-migrants
living in states with high gross migration rates earn less compared to non-migrants living in states
with low gross migration rates.
The coefcient of the added regressor, the estimated inverse mill's ratio, is positive for movers
and negative for stayers, indicating that movers experience a positive self-selection effect, and
stayers experience a negative self-selection effect. This result suggests that migrants are selected
predominantly from the upper tail of the wage distribution while stayers come predominantly from
the lower tail of the wage distribution in the population.
The wage equations are also estimated usingmig5 as the state-to-state migration indicator. The
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last four columns of Table 3 show the results of these estimations. Most of the coefcients retain
their sign and signicance when mig5 is used as the migration indicator. One interesting nding
is that the gross migration rate does not have a statistically signicant effect on the migrant wages
when mig5 is used in dening migration. This nding is not surprising when one considers the
difference between the migrant samples dened by mig1 and mig5. Mig5 is likely to generate a
migrants sample that consists of a smaller proportion of people who may become return migrants.
More information about destination labor markets is expected to have the biggest impact on the
wages of migrants who may become return migrants since these are the people who potentially
made wrong migration decisions by overpredicting or underpredicting their post-migration wages.
Additional information would enable such individuals to correct their migration decisions. The
subsample of migrants dened bymig5 is likely to consist of a relatively small proportion of people
who potentially made bad migration decisions. Therefore, it is plausible to expect information
about other labor markets to have a small inuence on the wages of these migrants. The gross
migration rate continues to have a negative and signicant effect on the wages of stayers when
mig5 is used as the migration indicator.
Next, I calculate the return to migration by taking the difference between the wages earned
by migrants and the wages that they would have earned at origin had they chosen not to migrate.
The latter is calculated based on the 2SLS estimates for the migrant subsample presented in Table
3. Since log(wage) is used as the migration outcome in the analysis, the return to migration can
be interpreted as the wage growth due to migration. When migration is dened by movement
across states within the past year, the average return to migration among migrants, measured as the
difference in log wages, is 0.074, and the median return among migrants is 0.033. Approximately
44 percent of migrants realize a negative return to migration. When migration is dened by
movement across states within the past ve years, the average return to migration among migrants,
measured is 0.044. Although the average return calculated using mig5 is smaller than the one
calculated using mig1, the median return among migrants is the same in both cases (0.033). As
expected, when migration is dened by mig5, a smaller proportion of migrants, namely 27 percent,
experience a negative return to their migration decisions.
The theoretical model presented in this paper has several implications regarding the changes in
the return to migration brought about by changes in the availability of information and by changes
in wage inequality at the destination. In order to empirically test these implications, I compare the
average return to migration across different groups of migrants. First, I present the average return
to migration by educational attainment (Table 4). Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap
with 1000 repetitions. Results using mig1 as the migration indicator shows that the average return
to migration is highest for highschool dropouts. Highschool graduates experience higher returns
to migration than college graduates and lower returns to migration than high school dropouts. In-
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dividuals with some college credits gain the lowest wage growth as a result of migration compared
to other educational groups. With the exception of the individuals in the 'some college' category,
the return to migration seems to decrease with education. One of the factors that can bring about
such a result is the variation in migration costs across educational categories. In particular, higher
migration costs among people with low education can generate the observed negative relationship
between educational attainment and the return to migration. If people with low education face
higher migration costs compared to higher educated people, then they would require higher return
to migration to justify migrating and incurring the associated high migration costs. In such a case,
we would observe a higher average return to migration among migrants with low education.
The observed higher return to migration among lower educated migrants can also arise if inter-
state differences in returns to skills vary across different skill categories. The results in Table 4 are
consistent with the hypothesis that interstate wage differentials are higher in jobs that are mostly
occupied by high school dropouts. If that is the case, when workers with less than a highschool
degree migrate to another state, they exploit the large interstate variation in wages and potentially
experience a large wage increase due to migration. On the other hand, if jobs that are lled by
college graduates have less variation in wages across states, then migrant with college degrees
experience smaller return to migration.
When migration is dened as changing states within the last ve years, the average return to
migration in the entire migrant subsample is smaller relative to the case where mig1 is used as
the migration indicator. The sample of migrants dened by mig5 consists of a smaller portion of
individuals who would eventually return back to their home states. Therefore, a comparison of
the average return to migration under the mig1 and mig5 columns may suggest that return migrants
tend to have higher wage growth due to migration than those whose moves are permanent. Based
on this result, one can infer that the return migration need not be driven by lower than expected
wages at the destination but perhaps by other factors such as those related to one's adjustment to
her new surroundings.
I also calculate the average return to migration among various migrant categories based on
the gross migration and outmigration rates in the migrants' states of origin. The cut-off migration
rates used in the denition of these categories are the gross migration and outmigration rates which
correspond to the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile observation in the migrant
subsample. The ndings presented in Table 5 suggest that the return to migration increases with
the migration rate in home state. In fact, individuals from states with gross migration rates less
than 13 percent and outmigration rates less than 7.17 percent on average experience a negative
return to migration. Since residents of states with high migration rates are likely to have easier
access to information about other labor markets, these ndings suggest that individuals with better
information about other labor markets outside their home states experience higher returns to their
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migration decisions. However, different average return to migration may arise for states with
different migration rates due to variation in resident characteristics across different states. For
instance, if states with high gross migration rates also have a high percentage of residents with less
than a high school degree, the high return to migration observed in these states may be due to the
substantial proportion of high school dropouts, who based on the Table 4 results tend to reap high
returns to their migration decisions.
In order to better tease out the relationship between gross migration rates and the return to
migration, I perform a comparative static exercise in which I increase the gross migration rate for
all migrants in the sample by 10 percent. Then, I calculate counterfactual post-migration wages
for migrants based on the parameters estimates of the wage equation. I use the counterfactual
migrant wages to calculate the return to migration and compare these returns to the ones presented
in Table 5. Any change in the return to migration can then be attributed to the 10 percent increase
in the gross migration rate because the gross migration rate is the only variable that changes in
this exercise. Furthermore, since the IV regression estimates of the wage equation are used in
calculating the post-migration wages under the higher gross migration rate, the resulting change in
the return to migration is due to the gross migration rate and not due to any economic factors that
are jointly related to the state migration rate and the residents' migration decisions. A limitation
of this comparative static exercise, however, is that it does not allow the composition of migrants
to change. While an increase in the gross migration rate can potentially change the composition
of the migrant sample, the sample of migrants are assumed to remain xed in this exercise after
the increase in the state migration rate.
Table 6 shows that when the gross migration rate in the migrants' home state rises by 10
percent, the average return to migration also rises in the entire migrant subsample as well as in
all migrant subsamples dened by migration rate categories. This provides further support for
the hypothesis that increased information about destination labor markets leads to higher returns
to migration as migrants are able to secure higher post-migration wages when they have access to
more information about job opportunities in other states.
Finally, I investigate the relationship between the income inequality in the destination and the
return to migration among migrants. To that end, I calculate the average return to migration for
different migrant subsamples based on income inequality measures in their destination states. The
theoretical model implies that the income inequality in the destination plays an important role
in an individual's migration decision as it partially determines the uncertainty surrounding post-
migration wages. I use two measures of income inequality in classifying states into different
categories of income inequality: 80:20 income ratio and 95:20 income ratio. 80:20 income ratio
is the ratio of income at the 80th percentile to that at the 20th percentile in the income distribution,
and the 95:20 income ratio is the ratio of income at the 95th percentile to that at the 20th percentile.
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These income ratios are calculated by Bernstein et al. (2006) for each state using the 2001-2003
Current Population Survey data. The cut-off ratios used in categorizing destination states into low,
middle and high income inequality states, correspond to the 25th percentile, the median and the
75th percentile observation in the migrant subsample.
Table 7 presents the average return to migration experienced by migrants stratied by income
inequality in their destination states. In general, the results suggest a negative relationship between
income inequality at the destination state and return to migration. Migrants who have migrated
to states with high income inequality seem to experience a smaller wage growth due to migration.
According to the theoretical model, high income inequality at the destination leads to greater un-
certainty faced by individuals regarding their post-migration wages. Therefore, the results in Table
7 suggest that migrants, who face greater uncertainty about their post-migration wages, experience
lower wage growth due to migration.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a model in which individuals make migration decisions under incomplete
information about the destination labor market. The model is based on the assumption that infor-
mation about destination labor market conditions is an important factor in the migration decision,
and one of the channels that carry such information to people is the network of friends and family
who have migrated previously. The model's implications reveal that increased information about
destination labor markets can have both positive and negative effects on the probability of migra-
tion and the return to migration. Thus, the model can be used to explain a wide set of empirical
ndings regarding the relationship between information and migration outcomes.
The model's implications regarding the effect of information on the probability of migration
critically depend on the population mean of the home and destination wages as well as the moving
costs. If the population mean of wages at origin exceeds the population mean of the wages at
destination, increased information regarding destination labor market conditions leads to lower
probability of migration. Otherwise, probability of migration increases with increased access to
information about other labor markets. Information about the destination affects the return to
migration through a composition and a scale effect. The composition effect reects the impact of
information on the return to migration through its effect on the composition of the migrant sample,
conditional on the rate of migration. The scale effect describes the effect of information on the
return to migration through its impact on the size of the migrant sample. While the composition
effect is always positive, the scale effect can be both positive or negative. The net effect of
information on the return to migration depends on the sum of these two effects.
The econometric model is specied as a switching regression model where the migration deci-
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sion determines the regime, and the wages are the economic outcomes of interest. The migration
and wage equations are estimated using data from the 2005 Current Population Survey. I use gross
migration rate in one's home state as a proxy for the level of information available to the individ-
ual regarding destination labor markets. This choice is based on the reasoning that people learn
about other labor markets through their friends and neighbors who have migrated to or from other
locations. Therefore, people who live in states with high gross migration rates have greater access
to information about labor market conditions in other states since residents of such states are more
likely to come into contact with people who have moved to or from other states. The gross mi-
gration rate, however, is likely to be endogenous in both the migration and wage equations since it
may be correlated with unobservables that can affect both the individual's migration decision and
her wage. The median age in the state of origin is used as an instrument for the gross migration
rate in the analysis.
The estimation results indicate that increased access to information about destination labor
market conditions increases one's probability of migration to another state. Information has a
statistically insignicant effect on the wages of migrants and a signicantly negative effect on
the wages of stayers. Furthermore, the ndings suggest that more information about other labor
markets leads to an increase in the return to migration among migrants. The return to migration
also varies with educational attainment. According to the empirical results, migrants with lower
education experience higher return to migration, measured by wage growth due to migration. In
addition, the average return to migration is lower among people who migrate to states with high
income inequality, suggesting that higher uncertainty about destination wages leads to lower return
to migration among migrants.
This paper emphasizes the role of information in migration outcomes. The theoretical model
provides a framework in which to study this concept. The empirical analysis provided in this paper
suggests that the information structure available to individuals at the time of the migration decision
is an important determinant of migration and economic outcomes related to migration. Future
research should investigate the extent to which differences in the level of information available to
different groups can explain the variation in migration outcomes observed across migrants with
different demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
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Appendix
A1. The Probability of Migration
The probability that a randomly chosen individual chooses to migrate is given by
P = Pr (1 + "  0   c > 0 + c   1) (24)
If we let  = 1 + "  0   c, then
P = Pr( > 0 + c   1) = 1  (z) (25)
where z = 0+c 1

; and  is the cdf a standard normal distribution. The derivative of P with
respect to n is
@P
@n
=  (z)  @z
@
 @
@n
(26)
First, I will simplify the expression for : By denition,  can be stated as
 =
p
V ar(1 + "  0   c) (27)
V ar(1 + "  0   c) =
V ar(1) + V ar(") + Cov(1; ")  Cov(1; 0)  Cov(1; c)
  Cov(0; ")  Cov(c; ") + Cov(0; c) + V ar(0) + V ar(c)
Since Cov(1; ") = Cov(0; ") = Cov(c; ") = 0; the expression for V ar(1 + "  0   c) can
be written as
V ar(1 + "  0   c) =
= V ar(1) + V ar(")  Cov(1; 0)  Cov(1; c) + Cov(0; c) + V ar(0) + V ar(c)
= 21 + 
2
" + 
2
0 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c = 21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
Then,  is given by
 =

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
0:5
(28)
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As a result, the third factor in the expression of @P
@n
can be written as
@
@n
= 0:5

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5


 
2
"
n2

(29)
The second factor in the expression of @P
@n
can be written as
@z
@
=

 0 + c   1
2

(30)
Finally, the derivative of n with respect to P is given by
@P
@n
=  (z)  @z
@
 @
@n
= (z) 

 0 + c   1
2

 0:5

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5


 
2
"
n2

(31)
Since (z) > 0; 2 > 0;

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5
> 0; and 
2
"
n2
> 0;
@P
@n
< 0 if 0 + c   1 > 0
@P
@n
> 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 (32)
The derivative of P with respect to " is
@P
@"
=  (z)  @z
@
 @
@"
=  (z) 

 0 + c   1
2

 0:5

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5


2"
n

(33)
Since (z) > 0; 2 > 0;

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5
> 0; and 2"
n
> 0;
@P
@"
> 0 if 0 + c   1 > 0
@P
@"
< 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 (34)
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A2. The Return to Migration
The return to migration, R, can be expressed as
R = E(y1jM = 1)  E(y0jM = 1) (35)
The rst term in this expression is the expected value of destination earning conditional on migra-
tion, and the second term is the expected value of earnings at origin if the migrants had stayed at
origin, conditional on migration. These two terms can be expressed as follows:
E(y1jM = 1) = 1 + E(bj > 0 + c   1) = 1 + !!1 (36)
where ! = 1 + "; ! = Corr(!; ) and 1 =
(z)
1 (z) : Similarly,
E(y0jM = 1) = 0 + E(0j > 0 + c   1) = 0 + 001 (37)
where 0 = Corr(0; ): Then, the return to migration can be stated as
R = E(y1jM = 1)  E(y0jM = 1)
= 1   0 +
 
!!   00

1 (38)
The following expressions are needed to further simplify the equation for R:
0 = Corr(0; ) =
Cov(0; )
0
(39)
Cov(0; ) = Cov(0; 1 + "  0   c)
= Cov(0; 1) + Cov(0; ")  20   Cov(0; c) (40)
Since Cov(0; ");
Cov(0; ) = 01   20   0c (41)
001 =
01   20   0c
0
01 =
1

 
01   20   0c

(42)
! = Corr(!; ) = Corr(1 + "; 1 + "  0   c) =
Cov(1 + "; 1 + "  0   c)
!
(43)
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Cov(1 + "; 1 + "  0   c) =
V ar(1)+Cov(1; ") Cov(1; 0) Cov(1; c)+Cov("; 1)+Cov("; ") Cov("; 0) Cov("; c)
Since Cov(1; ") = Cov("; ") = 0;
Cov(1 + "; 1 + "  0   c) = 21   10   1c + 1"   0"   "c (44)
Then,
!!1 =
21   10   1c + 1"   0"   "c
!
!1 =
1

 
21   10   1c

(45)
If 0c = 1c = 0" = 1" and c" = 0; the expression for R can be further simplied to
R = 1   0 +
1

V ar(1   0) (46)
Given Equation 46, the derivative of R with respect to n is given by
@R
@n
=

1

 @1
@n
  1
2
 @
@n

V ar(1   0) (47)
In order to be able to sign this derivative, one has to consider the derivatives of @1
@n
and @
@n
:
@1
@n
=
@1
@z
 @z
@
 @
@n
(48)
The three factors in this equation have the following signs:
@1
@z
> 0 (49)
As shown above,
@z
@
> 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0
@z
@
< 0 if 0 + c   1 > 0 (50)
and
@
@n
= 0:5

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5


 
2
"
n2

< 0 (51)
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Therefore,
@1
@n
> 0 if 0 + c   1 > 0
@1
@n
< 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 (52)
Then,
@R
@n
< 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 and
1

 @1
@n
>
1
2
 @
@n
@R
@n
< 0 otherwise (53)
Equation 46 can also be used to calculate the derivative of R with respect to ":
@R
@"
=

1

 @1
@"
  1
2
 @
@"

V ar(1   0) (54)
As shown above, @
@"
= 0:5

21 +
2"
n
+ 20 + 
2
c   01   1c + 0c
 0:5
  2"
n

> 0:
Furthermore,
@1
@"
=
@1
@z
 @z
@
 @
@"
(55)
@1
@z
> 0 (56)
@
@"
> 0 (57)
@z
@
> 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0
@z
@
< 0 if 0 + c   1 > 0 (58)
Therefore,
@R
@"
> 0 if 0 + c   1 < 0 and
1

 @1
@"
>
1
2
 @
@"
@R
@"
< 0 otherwise (59)
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A3. The Prediction Error
The prediction error is dened as the difference between the predicted post-migration earnings
and the actual post-migration earnings. The expected value of the prediction error in the entire
population is
E(ye1   y1) = E(1 + 1 + "  1   1   ") = 1   1 + E(1 + "  1   ") (60)
Since E(") = E(") = 0;
E(ye1   y1) = 0 (61)
The expected value of the prediction error among migrants is E(ye1 y1jM = 1): This expression
depends on E(ye1jM = 1); which can be expressed as follows:
E(ye1jM = 1) = 1 + E(1 + "j > 0 + c   1 (62)
Let a = 1 + ": Then,
E(ye1jM = 1) = 1 + aa1 (63)
The following calculations are used in simplifying the expression for E(ye1jM = 1):
a =
Cov(1 + "; 1 + "  0   c)
a
(64)
Cov(1 + "; 1 + "  0   c) =
V ar(1)+Cov(1; ") Cov(1; 0) Cov(1; c)+Cov(1; ")+V ar(") Cov(0; ") Cov(c; ")
Since Cov(1; ") = Cov(0; ") = Cov(c; ") = 0;
Cov(1 + "; 1 + "  0) = 21   01   1c +
2"
n
(65)
Then,
E(ye1jM = 1) = 1 +
21   01   1c + 
2
"
n

1 (66)
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and the prediction error among migrants can be stated as
E(ye1jM = 1)  E(y1jM = 1) =
1 +
1


21   01   1c +
2"
n

  1  
1

 
21   01   1c

=
1


2"
n

> 0
Note that as n!1; 2"
n
! 0 and E(ye1jM = 1)  E(y1jM = 1)! 0:
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Variable Name Variable Definition
Whole Sample Migrants Stayers Difference
Mig1
=1 if R moved to another state 
within the past year
0.026
(0.001)
Mig5
=1 if R moved to another state 
within past five years
0.081
(0.001)
Log(wage) Log of hourly wage 2.694 2.645 2.695 0.050
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.020)
Age Age in years 40.597 34.739 40.753 6.014
(0.053) (0.303) (0.053) (0.308)
Experience Age - years of schooling - 6 23.244 17.159 23.405 6.246
(0.052) (0.309) (0.053) (0.314)
High school
=1 if highest degree earned is 
high school diploma
0.588 0.530 0.590 0.060
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
College
=1 if highest degree earned is 
bachelor's or higher
0.295 0.353 0.293 -0.059
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
Male =1 if male 0.534 0.561 0.533 -0.027
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
White =1 if white 0.823 0.786 0.824 0.038
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.011)
Married =1 if married 0.595 0.456 0.599 0.143
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
Number of 
children
Number of children in the 
household
0.838 0.631 0.843 0.212
(0.004) (0.025) (0.004) (0.025)
Mean 
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
(Standard Deviation)
Own house =1 if household owns home 0.730 0.376 0.740 0.363
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
Center city
=1 if respondent lives in 
central city in metro area
0.836 0.856 0.836 -0.021
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009)
Self-employed
=1 if respondent is self-
employed
0.099 0.069 0.100 0.030
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008)
Unemployed
=1 if employment status is 
unemployed
0.041 0.083 0.040 -0.043
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
Manager
=1 if R works in management 
occupation
0.342 0.338 0.342 0.003
(0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.012)
Service
=1 if R works in a service 
occupation
0.417 0.428 0.417 -0.012
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
Production
=1 if R works in production 
occupation
0.132 0.124 0.132 0.009
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008)
Northeast
=1 if respondent lives in 
northeast US
0.188 0.150 0.189 0.039
(0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009)
Midwest
=1 if respondent lives in 
midwest US
0.232 0.189 0.233 0.045
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010)
South
=1 if respondent lives in 
southern US
0.352 0.406 0.351 -0.055
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013)
Sample Size 97,864 2,374 95,490
Notes:
1. Standard errors of means are in parentheses.
2. Sampling weights are used in the calculation of the statistics presented in this table.
3. Mig1 migration indicator is used in the definition of migration; therefore, 
   migrants moved to a different state within the past year.
Table 2: Estimates of the Migration Equation
Mig1 Mig5 Mig1 Mig5 Mig1 Mig5
Age 0.0044*** 0.0190*** 0.0045*** 0.0190*** 0.0047*** 0.0191***
(0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0018)
Age squared 0.0000*** -0.0001*** 0.0000*** -0.0002*** 0.0000*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Experience -0.0035*** -0.0148*** -0.0035*** -0.0146*** -0.0036*** -0.0146***
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0014)
Experience squared 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
High school -0.0030 -0.0175*** -0.0036 -0.0186*** -0.0046 -0.0196***
(0.0029) (0.0055) (0.0028) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0055)
College 0.0009 -0.0091 0.0002 -0.0099 0.0000 -0.0100
(0.0048) (0.0083) (0.0046) (0.0082) (0.0050) (0.0082)
Male 0.0026** 0.0089*** 0.0026** 0.0089*** 0.0029** 0.0091***
(0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0021)
White 0.0010 -0.0021 0.0010 -0.0019 0.0009 -0.0021
(0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0026)
Married 0.0003 0.0070*** 0.0004 0.0069*** 0.0004 0.0069***
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0024)
Number of children -0.0018*** -0.0062*** -0.0017*** -0.0058*** -0.0016*** -0.0054***
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0010)
Own house -0.0392*** -0.0926*** -0.0392*** -0.0934*** -0.0429*** -0.0957***
(0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0032)
Center city -0.0009 -0.0076*** 0.0001 -0.0039 0.0028* 0.0004
(0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0028)
Self-employed -0.0005 -0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0036
(0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0034)
Unemployed 0.0161*** 0.0296*** 0.0161*** 0.0291*** 0.0171*** 0.0292***
(0.0034) (0.0061) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0036) (0.0059)
Manager 0.0001 0.0070* 0.0004 0.0076* 0.0009 0.0082*
(0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0021) (0.0040) (0.0023) (0.0041)
(I) (II) (III)
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Service 0.0006 0.0045 0.0009 0.0048 0.0010 0.0050
(0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0037)
Production 0.0005 -0.0027 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0018 -0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0022) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0042)
Northeast -0.0053*** -0.0192*** -0.0021 -0.0078** 0.0082*** 0.0071*
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0041)
Midwest -0.0025* -0.0128*** 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0133** 0.0165***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0045)
South 0.0035** 0.0114*** 0.0041*** 0.0139*** 0.0052*** 0.0156***
(0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0027)
Gross migration rate 0.0007*** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0058***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Notes:
1. Mig1 and Mig5 refer to the dependant variable used in the regression. 
2. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
3. Probit regressions are weighted.
4. In specification (III), gross migration rate is instrumented with the median age in state.
5. Marginal effects are reported.
6. (*) Significant at 10% level, (**) Significant 5% level, (***) Significant 1% level.
Table 3: Estimates of the Wage Equation
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
Age 0.0652** 0.1107*** 0.0698** 0.1105*** 0.1008*** 0.1150*** 0.0981*** 0.1141***
(0.0272) (0.0044) (0.0316) (0.0044) (0.0152) (0.0047) (0.0206) (0.0047)
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004** -0.0004***
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Experience -0.0299 -0.0657*** -0.0343 -0.0661*** -0.0584*** -0.0677*** -0.0562*** -0.0678***
(0.0213) (0.0033) (0.0261) (0.0033) (0.0112) (0.0035) (0.0156) (0.0035)
Experience squared -0.0003 -0.0001* -0.0003 -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001* 0.0000 -0.0001**
(0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
High school 0.0324 0.0090 0.0092 0.0100 0.0396 0.0132 0.0464 0.0115***
(0.0925) (0.0125) (0.1216) (0.0126) (0.0458) (0.0130) (0.0560) (0.0132)
College 0.2865* 0.1464*** 0.2522 0.1367*** 0.2468*** 0.1607*** 0.2554*** 0.1409***
(0.1492) (0.0209) (0.1886) (0.0212) (0.0737) (0.0220) (0.0844) (0.0227)
Male 0.2981*** 0.2591*** 0.2978*** 0.2573*** 0.2669*** 0.2641*** 0.2689*** 0.2608***
(0.0372) (0.0053) (0.0374) (0.0054) (0.0193) (0.0056) (0.0218) (0.0057)
White 0.0663* 0.0363*** 0.0701* 0.0353*** 0.0119 0.0298*** 0.0111 0.0300***
(0.0373) (0.0061) (0.0386) (0.0062) (0.0203) (0.0065) (0.0207) (0.0065)
Married 0.1089*** 0.0927*** 0.1117*** 0.0972*** 0.1393*** 0.1001*** 0.1396*** 0.1049***
(0.0360) (0.0056) (0.0372) (0.0057) (0.0188) (0.0058) (0.0189) (0.0059)
Manager 0.2293*** 0.1947*** 0.2402*** 0.1895*** 0.2305*** 0.2021*** 0.2269*** 0.1946***
(0.0734) (0.0096) (0.0875) (0.0098) (0.0343) (0.0101) (0.0396) (0.0103)
OLS 2SLS
Migration Indicator is Mig1 Migration Indicator is Mig5
OLS 2SLS
Service -0.0059 -0.0895*** 0.0030 -0.0939*** -0.0614* -0.0857*** -0.0634** -0.0910***
(0.0640) (0.0085) (0.0768) (0.0087) (0.0300) (0.0090) (0.0321) (0.0091)
Production 0.0462 -0.0678*** 0.0545 -0.0793*** -0.0837** -0.0721*** -0.0908* -0.0821***
(0.0772) (0.0093) (0.0828) (0.0097) (0.0356) (0.0098) (0.0507) (0.0101)
Gross migration rate 0.0031 -0.0013*** 0.0113 -0.0166*** 0.0010 -0.0011*** -0.0087 -0.0173***
(0.0022) (0.0004) (0.0290) (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0501) (0.0035)
Constant 0.3905 -0.3003*** 0.1674 0.0291 -0.0957 -0.3035*** 0.1493 0.0747
(0.4051) (0.0639) (0.8910) (0.1006) (0.2329) (0.0672) (1.2805) (0.1059)
Inv. Mill's Ratio 0.1198* -0.2342*** 0.1272* -0.2085*** 0.2565*** -0.2545*** 0.2419*** -0.2081***
(0.0651) (0.0100) (0.0697) (0.0119) (0.0374) (0.0117) (0.0841) (0.0156)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
2. In the 2SLS estimation, gross migration is instrumented by the median age in the state.
3. Both regressions are weighted.
4. (*) Significant at 10% level, (**) Significant 5% level, (***) Significant 1% level.
Table 4: Average Return to Migration by Education
Mean Standard Error Mean Standard Error
Entire sample 0.074 0.0045 0.0445 0.0007
Education Categories
     Less than highschool 0.1343 0.0127 0.0610 0.0025
     Highschool 0.0877 0.0089 0.0436 0.0015
     Some college 0.0404 0.0079 0.0241 0.0014
     College 0.0695 0.0075 0.0550 0.0012
Notes:
1. Sample includes migrants.
2. Return to migration is calculated by each migrant's post-migration wage minus 
   his/her estimated counterfactual pre-migration wage.  The average of the individual
   returns are presented in the table.
3. Standard errors are calculated from 1000 bootstrap repetitions.
Migrants Moved Within Last Year
Migrants Moved Within Last Five 
Years
Table 5: Average Return to Migration by Migration Rates in State of Origin
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
By Gross Migration Rate in the Home State
     Gross migration rate less than or equal to 13 -0.120 0.003 -0.016 0.001
     Gross migration rate between 13 and 22.6 0.021 0.003 0.029 0.001
     Gross migration rate greater than or equal to 22.6 0.310 0.008 0.114 0.001
By Outmigration Rate in the Home State
     Outmigration rate less than or equal to 7.17 -0.101 0.004 -0.010 0.001
     Outmigration rate between 7.17 and 10.69 0.013 0.003 0.026 0.001
     Outmigration rate greater than or equal to 10.69 0.339 0.009 0.126 0.001
Notes:
1. Sample includes migrants.
2. Return to migration is calculated by each migrant's post-migration wage minus 
   his/her estimated counterfactual pre-migration wage.  The average of the individual
   returns are presented in the table.
3. Standard errors are calculated from 1000 bootstrap repetitions.
4. State migration rates used in the analysis are obtained from the calculations done 
   by U.S. Census Bureau using the U.S. Census 2000 (Franklin, 2003).
Migrants Moved Within 
Last Year
Migrants Moved Within 
Last Five Years
Table 6: Effect of an Increase in the Gross Migration Rate on Average Return to Migration
Average Return 
to Migration 
Among Migrants
Average Return 
to Migration 
when Gross 
Migration Rate 
Increases by 
10%
Change in 
Average Return 
to Migration
(I) (II) (II)-(I)
Entire Migrant Subsample 0.074 0.128 0.054
(0.004) (0.005)
By Gross Migration Rate in the Home State
     Gross migration rate less than or equal to 13 -0.120 -0.086 0.034
(0.003) (0.003)
     Gross migration rate between 13 and 22.6 0.021 0.069 0.049
(0.003) (0.003)
     Gross migration rate greater than or equal to 22.6 0.310 0.387 0.078
(0.008) (0.008)
Notes:
1. Sample includes migrants.
2. Return to migration is calculated by each migrant's post-migration wage minus 
   his/her estimated counterfactual pre-migration wage.  The average of the individual
   returns are presented in the table.
3. Standard errors are calculated from 1000 bootstrap repetitions and are given in parentheses.
4. State migration rates used in the analysis are obtained from the calculations done 
   by U.S. Census Bureau using the U.S. Census 2000 (Franklin, 2003).
Table 7: Average Return to Migration by Income Inequality in the Destination State
Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
By 80:20 Income Ratio in the Destination State
     80:20 Income Ratio less than or equal to 6.4 0.084 0.007 0.048 0.001
     80:20 Income Ratio between 6.4 and 7.6 0.067 0.006 0.043 0.001
     80:20 Income Ratio greater than or equal to 7.6 0.080 0.012 0.039 0.002
By 95:20 Income Ratio in the Destination State
     95:20 Income Ratio less than or equal to 10.3 0.082 0.007 0.047 0.001
     95:20 Income Ratio between 10.3 and 13 0.072 0.007 0.047 0.001
     95:20 Income Ratio greater than or equal to 13 0.067 0.010 0.034 0.002
Notes:
1. Sample includes migrants.
2. Return to migration is calculated by each migrant's post-migration wage minus 
   his/her estimated counterfactual pre-migration wage.  The average of the individual
   returns are presented in the table.
3. Standard errors are calculated from 1000 bootstrap repetitions.
4. Income ratios used in the analysis are calculated by Bernstein et al. 
   using 2001-2003 Current Population Survey (Bernstein, 2006).
Migrants Moved Within 
Last Year
Migrants Moved Within 
Last Five Years
